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he deterrent efect of CIA’s, however, has been questioned,2 
and even OIG has demonstrated that billion dollar settlements 
are not a suicient deterrent to change corporate culture.3  
While some alternatives have been ofered,4 OIG has respond-
ed by indicating its intent to exclude corporate executives in 
the life sciences industry from federal healthcare programs 
“under a broader range of circumstances,”5 including the 
responsible corporate oicer (RCO) doctrine.  FDA has also 
indicated its intent to use the RCO doctrine in guidance issued 
in February 2011.6   By excluding corporate oicers, OIG said 
it could “inluence corporate behavior without putting patient 
access to care at risk” and “alter the cost-beneit calculus of the 
corporate executives who run these companies.”7  
Holding true to their promise, HHS excluded three former 
Purdue Frederick Company (“Purdue”) executives in 2007 for 
their misdemeanor misbranding convictions under the RCO 
doctrine.  On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
O
ver the last three years, the Health Care Fraud 
Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT) 
has recovered over $10.2 billion in healthcare fraud 
settlements, many involving pharmaceutical companies 
charged with the “off-label promotion” of drugs to healthcare 
providers.1  As an effort to change corporate culture, each of 
these settlements has included a corporate integrity agreement 
(CIA) with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
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District of Columbia Circuit upheld their 
exclusions in Friedman v. Sebelius because 
the executives’ misdemeanor convictions 
were factually related to fraud.  he court, 
however, remanded the case back to the 
district court regarding the 12-year exclu-
sion length because HHS failed to explain 
why the penalty was three times longer 
than penalties imposed in comparable cas-
es in the past8 and four times longer than 
the presumptive baseline in the statute.9    
Consequently, lawyers and healthcare 
stakeholders must closely examine this 
decision because OIG may “expand its 
use of [permissive] exclusion against 
individuals”10 and the decision may 
encourage more RCO prosecutions.  As 
a result, these exclusions may have the 
unintended consequence of deterring 
“talented, qualiied, and ethical individu-
als from working in senior or leadership 
positions in the”11 life sciences industry 
for fear of being excluded when they 
engaged in no wrongful conduct.  
Case Background
In May 2007, Purdue pled guilty to 
felony misbranding, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 331(a) and § 333(a)(2) of the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 
because some of Purdue’s employees made 
misrepresentations to healthcare provid-
ers that the painkiller Oxycontin was less 
addictive, less subject to abuse and diver-
sion, and less likely to cause tolerance and 
withdrawal than other pain medications.12 
Purdue was placed on probation for ive 
years, ined $500,000, and sufered other 
monetary sanctions totaling approximate-
ly $600 million, of which approximately 
$160 million was earmarked for restitution 
to Federal and State healthcare agencies.13  
At the same time, the three execu-
tives14 each pled guilty to a single count of 
misdemeanor misbranding as “respon-
sible corporate oicers” under the RCO 
doctrine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) 
and § 333(a)(1), for their admitted failure 
to prevent Purdue’s fraudulent marketing 
of OxyContin.  Under the RCO doctrine, 
criminal liability for an FDCA violation 
does not require “awareness of some 
wrongdoing” or “conscious fraud.”15  In 
Friedman, the D.C. Circuit reasoned 
that because the executives, as part of 
their plea agreements, admitted having 
“responsibility and authority either to 
prevent in the irst instance or to prompt-
ly correct” the of-label promotion, the 
executives admitted being guilty of mis-
demeanor misbranding under the RCO 
doctrine.16  However, both the presiding 
judge who accepted the corporate and ex-
ecutive plea agreements and the prosecut-
ing U.S. Attorney recognized the absence 
of any proof that the executives had any 
personal knowledge of the misbranding 
or any personal intent to defraud.17
Nevertheless, the court’s holding estab-
lished an unfamiliar precedent because 
unlike the seminal RCO cases, U.S. v. 
Dotterweich18 and U.S. v. Park, in which 
the penalties were “relatively small” and 
conviction did no “grave damage” to the 
person’s reputation,19 the executives in 
Friedman had to disgorge approximately 
$34.5 million in compensation and faced 
what amounted to a lifetime ban from 
the pharmaceutical industry.
Four months ater the executives were 
sentenced, OIG informed them of its 
intent to exclude them from participating 
in any federal healthcare program for 20 
years, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)
(1), which authorizes OIG to exclude an 
individual convicted of a “misdemeanor 
relating to fraud, thet, embezzlement, 
breach of iduciary responsibility, or 
other inancial misconduct.”  he execu-
tives appealed OIG’s determination to 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and 
ultimately to the Departmental Appeals 
Board (DAB).  While OIG reduced the ex-
clusion to 15 years because the executives 
had assisted law enforcement authorities 
to combat abuse of OxyContin, the DAB 
airmed the exclusion, only reducing its 
length to 12 years because there was no 
substantial evidence that the misbranded 
Oxycontin had any adverse efect on pro-
gram beneiciaries and others.  he U.S. 
District Court upheld the exclusion.  
Expanding Exclusion Under the 
RCO Doctrine 
he Friedman case presented the 
question of whether the phrase “mis-
demeanor relating to fraud” in section 
1320a-7(b)(1)(A) refers to a (1) generic 
criminal ofense—the categorical ap-
proach—or (2) to the facts underlying the 
particular defendant’s conviction—the 
circumstance-speciic approach.  
he “categorical approach,” according 
to which the statutory term refers to the 
generic criminal ofense, “prohibits the 
later court from delving into particular 
facts disclosed by the record of convic-
tion” and directs that court to “look only 
to the fact of conviction and the statutory 
deinition of the prior ofense,” includ-
ing the elements of that ofense.20  Under 
the “circumstance-speciic” approach, 
by contrast, the statutory term refers to 
the particular conduct giving rise to the 
conviction and so the court “must look to 
the facts and circumstances underlying 
an ofender’s conviction” to determine 
whether that conviction is covered by 
the statute.21  he court reasoned that the 
text, structure, and purpose of the exclu-
sion statute indicated that the Secretary’s 
circumstance-speciic approach was 
proper.  he court, however, noted a “split 
in authority on the question whether to 
defer to an agency’s interpretation of a 
term drawn from criminal law but used 
in a statute the agency administers.”22  
he key phrase in the exclusion statute 
the court used to uphold the executives’ 
November/December 2012       UPDATE 21FDLI
Enforcement Issue
exclusions was “relating to,” which the 
court broadly deined as “stand[ing] in 
some relation; to have bearing or concern; 
to pertain; refer; to bring into association 
with or connection with.’”23  Using this 
deinition, the court reasoned that ‘relat-
ing to’ “includes any criminal conduct 
that has a factual “connection with” or 
reference to fraud.24  he court explained 
that “relating to fraud” modiies “misde-
meanor” and that a “conviction,” meant a 
particular event on a particular occasion 
and “so refers to a set of facts, and not to a 
generic crime.”25  Consequently, the court 
explained that “Misdemeanor misbrand-
ing does not necessarily require a culpable 
mental state” like generic misdemeanors 
“because a conviction for the ofense may 
be, and in this case was, predicated upon 
the responsible corporate oicer doctrine, 
which entails strict liability.”26
Pointing to the “broad scope” of 1320a-
7(b)(1)(A), the court used three examples to 
support its position.  First, the court main-
tained that exclusion for a misdemeanor 
relating to “other inancial misconduct” 
“expressly refers to a type of ‘conduct,’ not 
to a genus of criminal ofense.”27  here-
fore, the term “misdemeanor” refers to the 
particular circumstances of an individual’s 
conviction, and “relating to” must denote 
a factual relationship between the conduct 
underlying the misdemeanor and the 
conduct underlying a “fraud.”28
Second, the court reasoned that the lim-
iting clause in section (b)(1)(B) “does not 
pick out a generic class of ofenses because 
there is no generic crime of defrauding a 
program other than a healthcare program 
inanced in whole or in part by a govern-
ment agency.”29  As a result, the court 
explained that the “criminal ofense” must 
“relate to fraud” because it has a factual 
relationship to conduct involving a pro-
gram inanced by a government agency, 
committed on a particular occasion.
hird, the court explained that the 
phrase “the use of funds” in section 
1320a-7(b)(2)(ii) does not refer to a generic 
ofense and therefore must refer to speciic 
facts on a particular occasion.  As a result, 
the court maintained that “related to” in 
this provision denotes a factual connec-
tion between an “investigation or audit” 
and “the use of funds.”  Accordingly, the 
court asserted that “he only reason-
able interpretation is that in all three 
provisions the phrases refer to a factual 
relationship.”30  he Court also reasoned 
that the heading of section 1320a-7(b)(1) 
(“Conviction relating to fraud”) further 
supports this reading of the provision.  
he court then evaluated the three ag-
gravating factors OIG relied on to exclude 
the executives for 12 years—(1) the con-
duct underlying the convictions lasting 
more than one year, (2) the amount of 
the inancial loss, and (3) the signiicant 
adverse physical or mental impact upon 
program beneiciaries.  First, the Court 
rejected the argument that there was 
no inancial loss because Purdue paid 
$160 million in “restitution,” which the 
executives admitted responsibility for and 
because Purdue generated almost $3 bil-
lion in revenues from OxyContin during 
the time it misbranded the drug,” much 
of which came from Federal and State 
healthcare programs that would not have 
been paid for but for the misbranding.31    
Second, while the executives’ viola-
tions consisted solely of omissions, 
rather than “acts,” the Court concluded 
that HHS’ interpretation equating the 
two terms when only “acts” are pro-
scribed was a permissible one.32  hird, 
the Court rejected the executives’ argu-
ment that HHS gave insuicient weight 
to their cooperation with law enforce-
ment agencies because the executives did 
not show that the Secretary had abused 
her discretion.33  
he Court however, agreed with the ex-
ecutives that there was substantial evidence 
that HHS did not take into account the ex-
ecutives’ lack of “conscious wrongdoing” as 
a mitigating factor.34  he Court also found 
that the length of the executives’ exclusion 
was arbitrary and capricious because (1) 
every case cited by HHS involved a manda-
tory exclusion with a presumptive baseline 
of ive years, not a discretionary exclusion 
with a presumptive baseline of three years; 
(2) every case cited involved either a felony 
or Medicare fraud conviction for which 
the defendant was incarcerated, which was 
not present in this case; and (3) “none of 
the cases cited even concerned an exclu-
sion under section 1320a-7(b)(1),” and HHS 
“had never excluded anyone for more than 
ten years” based upon a misdemeanor—the 
longest was four years.35     
Conclusion/
Recommendations
While the Purdue executives may ile a 
petition for a rehearing by the entire D.C. 
Circuit, this case will have signiicant 
repercussions for those in the health-
care industry for several reasons.  First, 
the decision likely will deter corporate 
healthcare executives from agreeing to 
pleas under the RCO doctrine because 
doing so could lead to exclusion, which 
would efectively end their careers even 
where the exclusionary period is signii-
cantly less than 12 years.  As a result, it 
may be more diicult for the government 
and corporate defendants to resolve these 
types of cases through pleas, which may 
lead to increased litigation and related 
costs.   Executives, however, may still 
be forced to accept a misdemeanor plea 
because prosecutors may threaten them 
with indictments under a felony charge, 
which could result in jail time as well as 
mandatory exclusion.  hey may also face 
pressure from corporate boards or share-
holders to “take one for the team.”36
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Second, a plausible defense under the 
RCO doctrine is extremely diicult.  he 
government need only prove that the 
executive had supervisory authority at 
the time the underlying violations took 
place to convict senior executives of an 
RCO ofense.  Moreover, although Park 
created the defense of objective impos-
sibility,37 such a defense is impractical 
because “Even if the most thorough 
and assiduous supervision produced no 
evidence of a problem, it would always 
be objectively possible for a CEO, who 
has authority over an entire company, to 
have prevented wrongdoing.”38
hird, “before an organization pleads 
guilty, all counsel should scrutinize 
language in the statement of the ofense 
to reduce the quantity as well as the 
quality of admissions that could be used 
against an executive” not only at sentenc-
ing, but also in a debarment or exclusion 
proceeding.39  Companies that want to 
protect their executives from exclusion 
may want to refuse agreeing to plea facts 
“suggesting false, misleading or deceptive 
promotional practices by the company.”40 
Fourth, executives may be less likely to 
plead to misdemeanors without assur-
ances from OIG as to exclusion.  As a 
result, defense counsel will have to focus 
on achieving a global resolution early on 
in the negotiation process by engaging 
all government agencies involved, and if 
possible, to negotiate a waiver of exclu-
sion/debarment.41  Accordingly, counsel 
should request a decision from OIG about 
exclusion before any individual or organi-
zation pleads guilty, similar to how cor-
porate defendants negotiate the terms of 
their CIAs before entering criminal pleas 
or civil settlements.   “his request should 
be made even when an investigation is 
closed without a guilty plea because the 
OIG’s authority to seek permissive exclu-
sion does not require a criminal convic-
tion.”42  OIG likely will “resist the request 
for an advance decision about exclusion 
by claiming that it cannot exercise its 
discretion until ater the resolution of 
criminal and civil matters.”43  
his argument, however, is problem-
atic because OIG makes decisions about 
exclusions for companies before such 
cases are resolved by knowing enough 
about the investigation to accept the 
terms of the CIA.  Moreover, the case of 
Michael Dinkel is precedent that OIG 
will make a decision about exclusion 
before accepting a settlement.44  Ad-
ditionally, defense counsel may “argue 
that a timely decision about exclusion is a 
matter of due process because the parties 
need to evaluate the true impact of a pro-
posed agreement with the government.”45 
If OIG continues to refuse, defense 
counsel should negotiate a way to limit 
“the number of individuals or the types 
of positions that might be considered 
for permissive exclusion,”46 and should 
ask OIG to render exclusion decisions 
“within a certain period of time so that 
the organization and the individuals can 
plan their futures accordingly.”47
Ultimately, the Friedman case under-
scores “the government’s expectation 
that upper management be actively 
involved in ensuring corporate compli-
ance with federal healthcare laws and 
regulations.”48  Moreover, the case is 
a warning to individuals that a guilty 
plea could potentially result in exclu-
sion if OIG inds that there is a factual 
connection relating to fraud.  Accord-
ingly, healthcare stakeholders will need 
“to work proactively with OIG prior to 
accepting a guilty plea to better assess 
whether an exclusion proceeding may 
occur subsequent to conviction.”49  Ad-
ditionally, corporate executives should 
become integrally involved in their 
company’s compliance eforts to ensure 
that airmative steps are being taken to 
minimize the risk of misconduct. 
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